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Summary findings
The "pollution  haven"  hypothesis  refers to the possibility  The possibility  that country-  or industry-level  data,
that multinational  firms,  particularly  those engaged  in  typically  used in the literature,  may have  masked  the
highly  polluting  activities,  relocate  to countries  with  effect  at the firm level.
weaker  environmental  standards.  Despite  the plausibility  - Difficulties  associated  with measuring
and popularity  of this hypothesis,  there is little evidence  environmental  standards  of the host countries.
to support it.  * Difficulties  associated  with measuring  the pollution
Smarzynska  and Wei identify  four obstacles  that may  intensity  of the multinational  firms.
have  impeded  researchers'  ability  to find evidence  in  The authors attempt to surmount  these  obstacles  by
favor of the "pollution haven"  hypothesis:  explicitly  taking  into account corruption  in host
* The possibility  that some  features  of host countries,  countries  and using  a firm-level  data set on investment
such as bureaucratic  corruption,  may deter inward  projects  in 24 transition  economies.  With these
foreign  direct investment  and also  be positively  improvements,  the authors find some support for the
correlated  with lax environmental  standards.  Omitting  "pollution  haven"  hypothesis,  but evidence  is still  weak
this information  in statistical  analyses  may produce  and does not survive  numerous  robustness  checks.
misleading  results.
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The possibility that pollution-intensive multinational firms relocate to developing countries
with less stringent environmental standards has been labeled as "pollution haven" or "race-to-the-
bottom" hypothesis.  The logic sounds plausible: if it costs money to conform to more stringent
environmental requirements in developed countries, profit-maximizing firms would want to relocate
their production activities.'  The believers abound.  For examnple,  the Sierra Club states that that "in
our  global  economy,  corporations  move  operations freely  around  the  world,  escaping  tough
pollution control laws, labor standards, and even the taxes that pay for social and environmental
needs."2
The only trouble is to find convincing and supportive evidence. The empirical literature on
this  subject has largely failed to  detect a significant correlation between the location decision of
multinational firms and the environmental standards of host countries.  This includes virtually all
the papers surveyed in Dean (1992) and Zarsky (1999). To the best of our knowledge, the only
exception is a study by Xing and Kolstad (1998) which reports a positive association between the
amount of sulfur emissions in a host country and inflows of U.S. FDI in heavily polluting industries.
This evidence is based on a fairly small sample (no more than 22 observations in each regression),
so its robustness is subject to debate.  In any case, recent papers by Eskeland and Harrison (1997),
Letchumanan and Kodama (2000) and Wheeler (2000) again argue that the data does not support
the "pollution haven" hypothesis. 3
There  are  two  possible  ways to  summarize the  existing  empirical  studies.  The first
possibility is that the "pollution haven" hypothesis is after all just a popular myth that does not hold
in reality.  An alternative view is that the "pollution haven" hypothesis is valid but the empirical
researchers have not tried hard enough to uncover this "dirty secret."
There are indeed several areas in which researchers face data difficulties that may have
impeded their ability to  expose the "dirty secret."  First, there may be features of developing
countries that deter FDI but at the same time are correlated with laxity of environmental protection.
I Note that the "comparative advantage" created by weak enviromnental regulation could increase not only foreign but
also domestic investment in polluting sectors.
2 See "A Fair Trade Bill of Rights" at the Sierra Club website (http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/ftaa/rights.asp)
3Different  regions in the United  States also have different environmental standards. The empirical results  on U.S.
regional data are mixed. Levinson (1996) finds no evidence that this difference has systematically affected the location
choices of manufacturing plants.  Becker  and Henderson (2000) show, however, that the  annual designation of  air
quality attainment status which triggers specific equipment requirements at the county level in the U.S. reduces the
number of firm establishments in polluting industries in nonattainment areas.
2A leading example of such a feature is a host country's weakness in public institutions, particularly
the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption. Host country A may have less stringent environmental
protection than country B, which might make country A more attractive than country B to foreign
direct investment, particularly from the "dirty" industries. On the other hand, country A may also
have a more severe  corruption problem, which tends to  discourage inward foreign investment,
including those from the "dirty" industries. Indeed, it seems reasonable to  expect corruption and
laxity  of environmental  protection to  go  together, 4 so that  statistical analysis on  the effect  of
environmental policy on FDI that omits local corruption might fail to  detect an effect.  Several
studies have demonstrated that corruption in a host country is a significant deterrent to inward FDI
(Hines, 1995; Wei, 1997, 2000a and 2000b; and Smarzynska and Wei, 2000).  This points to the
importance  of  controlling for  the  effect  of  corruption  in  examining the  location  choices  of
multinationals.
Second, as Zarsky (1999, p. 66) stated after surveying the empirical literature, "the quality
of the evidence, both statistical and case study, is poor compared to the research needs.  In terms of
location decisions, most  of the  statistical studies rely on very  aggregated data about  'industry
choices'  which shed little light on firms or production stages."  This suggests the usefulness of
employing a firm-level data set.
Third,  it  is  very  hard  to  measure the  varying strength  of environmental  protection in
different host countries.  This difficulty is further exacerbated by the possibility that laws on the
book may not be the laws that are actually enforced.
Fourth,  assigning  pollution  intensity  measures  to  production  activities  of  different
multinational firms is a very challenging task.
A  combination of  these  difficulties may  have  prevented  researchers  from  detecting  a
statistically significant effect of environmental protection on the location choice of multinational
firms even if the "pollution haven" hypothesis is valid.
The objective of this paper is to tackle the problems in each of these four areas.  First, we
will explicitly take into account corruption in a host country as a possible deterrent to FDI (and
hence as a compounding factor in the effect of environmental standards on FDI).  Second, instead of
using country- or industry-level figures, we will make use of a unique firm-level data set that
describes  the  investment  decision  by  534  major  multinational  firms  in  24  countries  in
4  See Damania  et al. (2000) for a theoretical  and empirical  support for this claim. Further evidence of a positive
correlation  between  stringency  of environmental  regime  and incidence  of corrupt  payments  can be found in Esty and
3Central/Eastern Europe  and  the  former  Soviet Republics.  This  represents potentially  12,816
(=534X24) investment decisions at the firm level. 5
Third, to capture the strength of environmental protection in host countries, we adopt several
different measures that complement one another.  Specifically, we employ three types of measures:
(i) a degree of participation (ratification, signature but no ratification, or neither) in four different
international environmental protection treaties, covering transboundary aspects of  air pollution,
industrial accidents, use of water-courses and lakes, etc.  (ii) an index of the strength of the air and
water ambient and emission standards system as rated by European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (1997);  (iii) the actual reduction in  emissions of carbon dioxide, lead and  water
pollutants (scaled by the GDP growth). Reductions in emissions may be viewed as proxies for a
host  country's  effective  enforcement  of  environmental policies.  For  the  first  two  measures,
effectiveness of  enforcement is adjusted by using information on the number of environmental
NGOs in a country relative to its population size.
Note that the set of transition economies in the sample includes countries with relatively
high income and relatively high environmental standards (in terms of conformity with the European
Union standard) such as Poland and Czech Republic.  It also covers countries that are substantially
poorer and are perceived to  have much weaker environmental standards such as Azerbaijan and
Uzbekistan.  Therefore, there  is  a  reasonably big  variation in  the host-country environmental
standard in our sample.
Fourth,  we  compute  pollution  intensity  at  the  four-digit  SIC  industry  level  for  all
multinational firms in our sample, based on the data on actual pollution emissions and abatement
cost  of U.S.  firms  filed with  the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). We have the
emissions data for 269 and the abatement cost data for 140 four-digit SIC industries in our sample.
This  is  a  labor-intensive task,  but  the payoff  is  an  enhanced precision  in  assigning pollution
intensity to the production activities of multinational firns.  This is, however, still not a perfect
measure.  Note that we do not need to assume that the multinational firms in the source and host
countries have identical pollution intensity.  Instead, what we need is a weaker assumption: the
relative pollution  intensity between the overseas activities of the two multinational firms  (e.g.,
Porter (2000).
5 The actual number in the regressions is smaller due to missing values of various explanatory variables.
6 On the other hand, a recent survey of multinationals has indicated that in sixty-two percent of cases the development
of environment, health and safety laws and regulations in the home country had motivated changes in company-wide
environmental policies and programs (UNCTAD, 1992,  p. 38).
4Dupont Poland and Nike Poland) is proportional to their pollution intensity at home (e.g. Dupont
and Nike in the U.S.).
None of the previous papers in the literature has taken all of the above issues into account.
In that sense, our approach represents a significant improvement in the ability to uncover the "dirty
secret," if there is any, on the relationship between environmental protection in a host country and
the size and nature of its inward FDI.  Rather than keeping the suspense, we spell out the bottom
line right now.  With various improvements relative to the previous literature, we find some support
for  the  "pollution  haven"  hypothesis.  To  be  more  precise,  the  best  evidence  comes  when
participation  in  international environmental treaties is  used as  a  measure  of  a  host  country's
environmental standard.  In this  case, there  is  some evidence that  investment  from  pollution-
intensive multinational firms as a share of total inward FDI is smaller for host countries with a
higher environmental standards.  However, these findings do not survive various extensions and
robustness checks.  Therefore, our overall message is a caution against drawing strong conclusions
based on selective evidence.
The rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we  describe the
methodology and the data employed. Section III discusses the empirical results. The last section
concludes.
2.  METHODOLOGY AND KEY VARIABLES
Empirical model
Let FDIjk be a dummy for FDI from multinational firm j  to host country k.  FDIjk takes the
value of one if firmj  has established investment or has concrete plans to invest in host country k,
and zero otherwise.
Our strategy is to estimate some variant of the following probit specification:
Prob[FDIjk = 1  =  X rj + Hk  'Pk + Zjk r1+ I  Ek  + yD  DEk  +  ejk
where Xj is a vector of variables describing the characteristics of firm]j; Hk  is a vector of variables
describing the characteristics of host country k other than its environmental standards; Zjk is a vector
of variables describing the relationship between host country k and the source country where firnj
originates from; and 1j,  'k  and Hare  vectors of parameters with corresponding dimensions.  Dj is
an  index of firm j's  pollution  intensity or  "dirtiness,"  and Ek  is an  index of  host country k's
5environmental standards, possibly adjusted by the strength of enforcement. ejk  is an iid normally
distributed error term.
The parameter /8 captures a "volume  effect:"  a  negative (or  positive) /1 implies  that  a
stronger environmental protection in a host country tends to discourage (or encourage) inward FDI.
The parameter y captures a "composition effect:" a negative (or positive) y implies that more (or
less) pollution-intensive FDI  would go to  a  host country with relatively weaker environmental
standards. In other words, the "pollution haven" hypothesis can be represented by y < 0.
Crucial to our empirical strategy is to have plausible measures of pollution intensity Dj by
multinational firms and of the strength of environment protection by host countries, Ek.  We will
discuss the construction of these measures next.
Measuring pollution intensity of 4-digit SIC industries
We use two measures of pollution intensity of industries: one based on pollution emissions
and  one  on  abatement costs.'  The  first measure has  been  compiled from  the  Toxics Release
Inventory  (TRI)  data  collected  by  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency.  TRI  provides  a
comprehensive overview of toxic chemical pollution from manufacturing facilities in the United
States. In 1997, the reportable TRI chemical list contained 576 individually listed chemicals and 28
chemical categories. The database contains information on releases of toxic substances into air,
water, land and underground injections measured by  weight. A median value of  emissions for
reporting facilities in each 4-digit SIC code was found and was norrnalized by the mean value of
sales in that sector.
A histogram analysis of the pollution intensity (not reported to save space) indicates that the
data are  highly skewed.  A  very  small number of observations are more than three  standard
deviations away from the mean.  As we are not sure if this is caused by the outliers in the EPA data
or genuine difference in pollution intensity, we adopt a simple transformation that would help us
avoid the dominance of outliers in our subsequent statistical analyses.  More precisely, the data on
pollution was converted into a pollution intensity index taking on the values from 0 to 2 by using
the following criteria:  the index takes on the value of zero if emissions in all four categories (air,
land, water and underground) are in the lowest 33 percentiles; the value of 2 if emissions in any
category are in the top 33 percentiles; and finally, the value of 1 in all other cases.
7Note  that Eskaland and Harrison (2000) also used this data to construct their measures of pollution intensity.
6The second measure, the abatement index, is based on the data on total pollution abatement
expenditures  as reported  in  the Manufacturers'  Pollution  Abatement Capital Expenditures  and
Operating Costs Survey (Census Bureau, 1994). First, we aggregated operating costs and capital
expenditures  related  to  pollution  abatement.  Then,  we  followed a  similar  procedure to  that
described above to obtain median values (normalized by sales) for each SIC code. The abatement
data was also converted into an index ranging from 0 (if the normalized value was below the 33rd
percentile) to 2 (if the value was above the 66t percentile).
Both indices were calculated based on two 4-digit SIC codes that describe the operations of
each firm in our sample. 8 If the index values for the two industry codes differed, the higher value
was used. Note that dropping all firms for which index values differed between the two SIC codes
would not change the conclusions of the paper. For the purposes of illustration, Table I  lists the
classification of industries at the three digit SIC level. In the regressions, however, classification at
the four digit level has been used.
The main drawback of both indices is that they are based on the U.S. data.  Thus we are
assuming that pollution intensity of facilities set up by American investors overseas is the same as
that of U.S. facilities, or (perhaps a weaker assumption that) the pollution intensity of the overseas
production of two firms is proportional to their pollution intensity at home.
Further, it may be  argued that the total amount of pollutants emitted does not take into
account the differences in toxicity risks associated with different substances. Thus, an  industry
emitting a large quantity of a relatively harmless substance would rank as a greater polluter than
another industry emitting a small quantity of a  very potent pollutant. However, Dasgupta et al.
(1998) have shown that  at the  aggregate level, there is  no  significant variation in  ranking  of
industries based on total emissions and toxicity risks.
Strength of environmental standards and their enforcement
We measure the strength of environmental protection of the host countries in several different
ways, which include:
(a) Participation in international treaties.
Treaties = participation in international treaties. Five international treaties were developed by
the Economic Commission for Europe during the past twenty-one years. We take into account four
7treaties that came into effect before or during the time relevant for our data set (i.e., before 1995).
These are: the Convention on Long-range Transboundary  Air Pollution, the Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, the Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, and  the Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Water-courses and International Lakes. The information on treaties comes from the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. An index is created by awarding each country 1
point for ratifying each treaty prior to 1996 and 0.5 point for signing each treaty before 1996 or
ratifying it after that time. Thus, the index can range from 0 to 4.
Mindful that participation in treaties and enforcement on the ground are not the same thing, we
also wish to construct measures that adjust for possible strength of enforcement.  Since active NGO
movement tends to exert pressure on the government to enforce environmental regulation, we adjust
for enforcement strength by making use of information on the number of environmentally oriented
NGOs in a host country. Thus,
Enforcement-adjusted treaty index  = Treaties *  number of environmental NGOs per million
people in country k.
The figures on NGOs come from OECD (1999, p. 47).
(b) Quality of air and water ambient and emission standards
Standards = index of air and water ambient and emission standards in country k, which
ranges from 1 denoting the weakest standards to 3 denoting the strongest. This index reflects laws
on the books but not their enforcement. The source is EBRD (1997).
Similar to the previous measure, we also construct an enforcement-adjusted standard index
as
Enforcement-adjusted standard index = Standards * number of environmental NGOs per
million people in country k
(c) Observed actual reduction in various pollutants
'Note that Worldscope  database,  from which  we obtained  firm SIC  codes,  reports  up to nine  4 digit SIC  codes  for each
firm  ranked  in order  of importance.  We used  the first  two.
8For three major pollutants (water pollutants, lead, C02), we have collected data on actual
observed percentage reduction in a number of transition economies. These might be viewed as
result-based, enforcement-effort-adjusted, alternative measures of the strength of the environmental
standard in the countries..
Water = percentage reduction in emissions of organic water pollutants between  1990 and
1994.  The emissions levels (kg per day per worker), from which the reduction has been calculated,
come from the World Development Indicators database and are measured in terms of biochemical
oxygen  demand, which refers to the amount of oxygen that bacteria in  water will consume in
breaking down waste.
Lead = percentage reduction in total lead emissions between 1990 and 1996. Source: OECD
(1999, p. 47).
C02 =  percentage reduction in CO2 emissions between 1992 and 1995, calculated using
figures from the World Development Indicators database.
Since changes in emissions of lead and CO2 may be largely due to changes in output, we
make an adjustment to take it into account. Namely, we define two additional variables:
Reduction in Lead Emissions Adjustedfor  Changes in GDP = percentage reduction in total
lead emissions plus percentage change in GDP during the corresponding period.
Reduction in CO 2 Emissions Adjusted for  Changes in GDP = percentage reduction in CO 2
emissions plus percentage change in GDP during the corresponding  period.
Variables  Treaties and Standards reflect environmental standards on the book.  Adjusted
Treaties and Adjusted Standards are standards on the book adjusted for the strength of enforcement.
The  last  five  variables  reflect the  actual progress that  has  been made  in  lowering  pollution
emissions, thus they capture the combination of laws and their implementation.
All measures are standardized to  have a  zero mean and the standard deviation equal to
unity. All measures are listed in Table  2. Summary statistics are presented in  Table  3a, while
correlations can be found in Table 3b.
Measuring corruption in host countries
Corruption, by its very nature, is difficult to measure.  Most of the available indices are
based on subjective perceptions from surveys of firms or individuals.  Wei (2000b) discusses the
relative merits and drawbacks of four types of corruption measures.  Many of them do not cover
9enough transition economies to be useful to us.  Thus, we adopt a composite measure based on GCR
and WDR corruption indices. The GCR Index is derived from the Global Competitiveness Report
1997 produced jointly  by the  Geneva-based World Economic Forum and  Harvard Institute for
International Development. The survey for the report was conducted in late 1996 on 2,827 firms in
58 countries. The GCR Survey asked respondents to rate the level of corruption in their country on
a one-to-seven scale, based on the extent of "irregular, additional payments connected with imports
and exports permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan
applications." The GCR Corruption Index is based on the country average of the individual ratings.
The WDR Index comes from a  1996 World Bank survey of 3,866 firms in  73 countries
conducted in preparation for the World Development Report 1997. Question 14 of that survey asks:
"Is it cornmon for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular, 'additional'  payments
to get things done?"  The respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption on a one-to-six
scale. The WDR corruption index is based on the country average of the individual answers. 9
For both corruption indices, the original sources are such that a higher number implies lower
corruption.  To avoid awkwardness in interpretation, they are re-scaled in this paper so that a high
number now implies high corruption.
Each measure covers a different subset of countries for which we have investment data, thus
we  use a  composite corruption index derived by Wei  (2000b). Since both  indices come  from
surveys with  similar methodologies and similar questions and are highly correlated (0.83), Wei
combined them using the following procedure: (1) use GCR as the benchmark;  (2) compute the
ratio of GCR to WDR for all countries that are available in both GCR and the WDR; and (3) for
those countries that are covered by WDR but not GCR (which is relatively rare), convert the WDR
rating into the GCR scale by using the ratio in (2).
Other variables
Following  the  existing  literature on  determinants of  FDI,  our  regressions  also  include
proxies for market size (GDP), labor costs (GDP per capita) and corporate tax rate.'I
The dependent variable comes from a unique firm-level data set based on the EBRD Foreign
Investment Survey conducted in January 1995. A brief questionnaire was sent to about 9,500 firms
from all  over the world asking them about their  planned or undertaken investment projects in
9  This corruption measure was used, for instance, in Smnarzynska  and Wei (2000).
'° For a review of the literature on FDI determinants see Caves (1982) and Froot (1993).
10Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."l Additional information about the type of the project
was requested. The criterion for including a firm in the survey was a firm's  listing in a commercial
database  Worldscope, which provides detailed financial statements and business descriptions for
public companies located in more than fifty countries. Sending the questionnaire to all firms listed
assured that all major public companies in the world were included. Responses were obtained from
1,405 firms.'2 Unfortunately, the survey did not ask about the time when each investment was
undertaken. However, since the magnitude of FDI inflows into the region was marginal before
1989, the information collected pertains mostly to the period 1989-94.13
Our empirical analysis focuses on investment in manufacturing facilities since investment in
service sectors or in distribution alone is not likely to have a significant environmental impact. As
the objective of this study is to explore the impact of government policies on the magnitude and
nature of FDI inflows, firms in the oil, gas and coal sector, which are likely to be attracted to natural
resource endowments, are excluded from the estimations.
Information on firm characteristics, such as size and R&D intensity, is from  Worldscope.
The proxy for regional experience comes from the survey. The distance between the source and host
countries has  been calculated by  the authors. See Appendix  I for a  detailed description of  all
variables.
3.  ESTIMATION RESULTS
Basic Rearessions
We  begin  the  test  of  the  "pollution  haven"  hypothesis  with  regressions  employing
participation in international treaties as a proxy for environmental standards in a host country.  The
results, presented in terms of marginal effects, can be found in Table 4. As stated in the last section,
the coefficient on the environmental regime (labeled Env Regime) captures a volume effect - the
(marginal) effect of the strength of environmental protection in a host country on the overall volume
of inward FDI.  The coefficient on the product of the host country's environmental regime and the
'l  The source  countries  in the sample  listed  in order  of importance  include:  United  Kingdom,  United States,  Japan,
Canada, Germany, France, Finland, Switzerland, South Africa, Sweden, Ireland, Australia, Norway, Italy, Malaysia,
Netherlands,  Belgium,  Demnark,  New  Zealand,  Austria,  Singapore,  Portugal,  Argentina,  Colombia,  Greece,
Philippines, South Korea and Hong Kong, China.
12  117 of  the survey respondents were  chosen for in-depth  interviews whose results  are  discussed in Lankes  and
Venables (1996).
13 Eastern Europe and the  Soviet Union were virtually closed to foreign investment before  1989 (see Meyer, 1995;
Dunning and Rojec, 1993; Hunya, 1997).
11investing firm's pollution intensity captures a composition effect - whether stronger environmental
protection discourages the investment from more polluting industries by a greater amount.
The results  provide support for the composition effect but  little evidence of the volume
effect.  In the first column, we find that the interaction term between environmental regime and the
emission index bears a negative and statistically significant sign, as predicted by the hypothesis.
Environmental  standards  alone, however,  do  not  have a  statistically significant effect  on the
probability of investment.
The  volume  effect  (measured  by  a  host  country's  environmental  standards)  and  the
composition effect (measured by the product of a host country's standard and a multinational firm's
pollution intensity) are correlated.  To give the "pollution haven" hypothesis the maximum benefit
of doubt, we re-estimate the first regression dropping the measure of environmental standards but
leaving its interaction with investor pollution intensity. The interaction terms remains significant.
As  the introductory  section stated, omission of  the corruption variable  in the  previous
empirical papers may have been one reason why host country environmental standards did  not
appear to matter for inward FDI.  To make an assessment of this possibility, we estimate a model in
which host country corruption is dropped (but both environmental standards and the interaction
terms are included). As we can see in the third column, the interaction term gives evidence of the
composition  effect  but  no  volume  effect  is  present  (i.e.,  environmental  standards  remain
insignificant).
When we take into account enforcement of the international treaties (columns 4-6), again we
find  support for the  composition effect but  mixed evidence on the  volume effect.  Recall that
enforcement is proxied by the number of environmental NGOs in a host country relative to the
population size. The NGO variable is not available for all countries, and thus it restricts our sample
to Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia).' 4 Overall, the results
indicate that foreign investors in polluting industries are more likely to enter countries with less
stringent environmental standards, but this is not the case for foreign investors in general.
The other variables have the expected signs. We find that larger and less R&D-intensive
firms are more likely to undertake FDI.15 This is also the case for investors with previous regional
experience.  As  far  as  host  country characteristics are  concerned, the  data  indicate  that  large
countries and those located close to the investor's home country are more attractive to FDI. On the
14 The number of active NGOs could be affected by the extent of political freedom.  This is, however, unlikely to be an
issue in the subsample of transition economies for which are using the NGO data.
12other hand, high corporate taxes and a greater incidence of corruption discourage foreign investors.
GDP per capita does not appear to be significant in most regressions.
Robustness Checks and Extensions
To  check  the  robustness  of  our  findings,  we  present  results  from  regressions  using
alternative measures of environmental regulation (Table 5).  No support is found for the "pollution
haven"  when the raw EBRD's  rating of the air and water standard is used,  but there is  some
evidence in its favor if the EBRD rating is adjusted for enforcement. Further, there is no support for
the hypothesis when reductions in emissions are employed as a proxy for environmental regime.
This is the case for the raw reduction figures as well as for reductions adjusted for output changes.
Thus, the empirical evidence of the "pollution haven" hypothesis is not robust to using different
proxies for environmental standards in host countries.
As another robustness test, we re-estimate the model using abatement cost index to capture a
firm's  pollution  intensity  (Table 6).  When this change is made, the  evidence in  favor  of the
hypothesis disappears almost completely. The interaction term is not significant in any of the seven
regressions, indicating the there is no composition effect. The volume effect can be detected only in
one out of seven cases.
Since our measures of investor pollution intensity have been calculated using the U.S. data,
one could argue that this calls for limiting our sample to U.S. firms only. When we re-estimate our
model on this subsample (see Table 7), the evidence in favor of "pollution haven" hypothesis is
fairly weak.  The coefficient of environmental regulation is significant and negative only in two
cases and none of the interaction terms is negative and significant. Note that in this subsample tax
rates do not have a significant effect on investment decision, which may be due to tax credits U.S.
companies receive for tax payments made abroad.
Further, we re-estimate our model employing the Neumann index as a measure of corruption
incidence in host countries.  The regression results, presented in Table 8a, give some support to the
composition effect but no to the volume effect.  As before, the composition effect is present when
environmental regime is proxied by participation in international treaties and emission standards
(both laws on books and laws adjusted for enforcement), but not when reduction in emissions are
employed.
15 This is consistent with the findings of Smarzynska (1999).
13Finally, Table 8b presents the results with both Neumann index and abatement cost index.
In this case, hardly any support is found for the hypothesis.
We have performed further robustness checks that are not presented here. For instance, we
narrowed the sample to include only firms in highly polluting industries (emissions or abatement
index equal to two) and estimated the original model as well as the model without interaction terms.
The results produced gave very little support to the "pollution haven" hypothesis.
As an alternative way of adjusting the measures of environmental standards for enforcement,
we divided them by the corruption index.  This adjustment, however, did not alter the qualitative
results since the coefficients of interest remained insignificant in almost all the regressions.
Finally, we restricted our sample to include only firms that undertook at least one investment
in the region, thus limiting the number of zeros on the left-hand side. Again, the results led us to the
same conclusions.
Summing up, despite our best efforts we were unable to find more than a weak support for
the "pollution haven" hypothesis.  Our data indicate that host country environmental standards have
very little impact on FDI inflows both in terms of the volume and in terms of composition. We do
not find robust evidence of foreign investment in pollution-intensive industries flocking to countries
with weak environmental regimes.
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This  paper makes an effort in  four different areas to  enhance our  ability to  detect the
possible  "dirty  secret"  that  multinational  firms  flock  to  countries  with  weak  environmental
protection and that this is particularly the case for more pollution-intensive industries.  Our effort
includes (a) taking into explicit account the effect of host country corruption, (b) using firm-level
rather than country- or industry-level data, (c) employing a variety of measures that capture the
strength of environmental protection in host countries, and (d) constructing a measure of pollution
intensity at the 4-digit industry level.
With these improvements, we find some support for the "pollution haven" hypothesis.  In
particular,  the  most  supportive  evidence comes  when  a  country's  environmental  standard  is
measured by its participation in international environmental treaties. In this case, investment from
pollution-intensive multinational firms as a share of total inward FDI is lower for host countries
14with a higher environmental standard. However, the support for the "pollution haven" hypothesis is
not robust to various sensitivity checks.
Our findings are still subject to caveats. We have a relatively small number of host countries
so the variation of environmental protection may be limited.  The measures of pollution intensity
and of the strength of environmental protection can still be too noisy to allow us to obtain precise
estimates. Future work will, hopefully, improves on these dimensions.
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17APPENDIX I
Firm specific variables used in the empirical analysis come from  Worldscope, which is a
commercial database providing detailed financial statements, business descriptions, and historical
pricing information on thousands of public companies located in more than fifty countries. They
pertain to 1993 or the closest year for which the information was available and refer to worldwide
operations of each firm. Below we present a more detailed description of the variables.
>  Firm size: measured by a firm's sales in millions of U.S. dollars
>  Firm R&D intensity: measured by R&D expenditure as a percentage of net sales
>  Regional experience:  a dummy variable taking on the value of one if a firm had a trading
relationship with the region before 1990, zero otherwise. Source: EBRD survey
>  Distance: logarithm of distance in kilometers between the capital cities. The primary source is
Rudloff (1981), supplemented by Pearce and Smith (1984).  In the case of following countries
the  average  distance  from  the  main  cities  was  used:  Argentina  (Buenos  Aires,  Cordoba,
Rosario), Australia (Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne), Canada (Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal),
Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhni Novogorod). The data for Nizhni Novogorod is from
http://www.unn.runnet.ru/nn/whereis.htm. For  the United States Kansas  City, Missouri was
used, for Netherlands De Bilt, Slovakia Poprad, Switzerland Zurich. Distances between Taiwan
and other countries are from Shang-Jin Wei's NBER web site: www.nber.org/-wei.
>  Pollution emissions index:  1997 pollution emission data by facility comes from the EPA
website  (www.epa.gov/triexplorer/facility.htm). The volume  of  emissions  is  measured by
weight.  Four-digit SIC codes by facility were taken from a CD-ROM provided by the EPA,
which is labeled "RY  1998 TRI Database Files." The data can be found in Section 2.12 -
TRI_Facility_SIC_History. The information on all facilities that reported both an SIC code
and emissions were taken into account.  The SIC code and the emissions data were matched
for each facility.  If a facility reported more than one SIC code, each unique facility and SIC
pair was treated as an individual observation. The value of emissions for each observation was
divided by the number of SIC codes reported for the facility. The data was then regrouped by
SIC code and the median of all observations for a particular 4 digit SIC code was calculated
for each emissions category (air, land, water, underground).
The emissions  data were then normalized by the  average shipping volume  in the
industry. The information on shipping volumes comes from the 1997 Economic Census CD-
18ROM. The average shipping volume was found by dividing the 1997 value of sales, shipments
and receipts (given in thousands of dollars) by the number of establishments reporting for that
SIC code. If data on shipping volumes were not available for a particular SIC code, that code
was dropped. The data were then converted into an index as described in Section II
>  Abatement index: based on the 1994 data on total pollution abatement expenditures as reported
in the Manufacturers' Pollution Abatement Capital Expenditures and Operating Costs Survey
(PACE). Source: Census Bureau (1994). Total pollution abatement expenditures are equal to
the sum of operating costs and capital expenditures related to pollution abatement.  A similar
procedure to  that followed in the case of emissions index was used to  obtain normalized
median values for each 4 digit SIC code. Then the data was converted into an index ranging
from 0 (if the normalized value was below the 33rd percentile) to 2 (if the value was above the
66th percentile)
>  GDP and GDP per capita: data for 1993. Source: EBRD (1994)
>  GCR/WDR: see the description in Section II.
t  Corporate tax rate: in percentages; if several rates apply, the highest one was used. Source:
PriceWaterhousePaineWebber
>  Index of Air  and  Water Ambient and Emission (Effluent) Standards: grades how closely the
national environmental legislation approximates EU standards. Source: EBRD (1997).
Value of index  Description
1  Maximum permissible concentration (MPC) system in place, broadly based
on the former Soviet system
2  New system is being introduced, either as an evolution of MPC or in order to
meet EU requirements
3  Essentially new standards system is in place, often following EU
I requirements
>  Participation in key international treaties. These treaties are: the Convention on Long-range
Transboundary  Air  Pollution,  the  Convention  on  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  in  a
Transboundary Context, the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents,
and  the  Convention  on  the  Protection  and  Use  of  Transboundary  Water-courses  and
International Lakes. The information on treaties comes from the United Nations  Economic
Commission for Europe. An index is created by awarding each country 1 point for ratifying the
treaty prior to  1996 and 0.5 point for signing each treaty before 1996 or ratifying it after that
time. Thus, the index can range from 0 to 4.
19Number of Environmental NGOs per Million Population: data for 1996.  Source: OECD (1999,
p. 47)
>  Reduction in Lead Emissions: Percentage reduction in total lead emissions between  1990 and
1996. Source: OECD (1999, p. 47)
>  Reduction in Lead Emissions Adjustedfor  Changes in GDP: Percentage reduction in total lead
emissions plus percentage change in GDP during the corresponding period.
>  Reduction in  Water Pollutant Emissions: percentage reduction in emissions of organic water
pollutants that took place between 1990 and 1994 (measured in kg per day per worker). The
emissions  levels,  from  which  the  reduction  has  been  calculated,  come  from  the  World
Development Indicators database and are measured in terms of biochemical oxygen demand,
which refers to the amount of oxygen that bacteria in water will consume in breaking down
waste.
>  Reduction in CO2 Emissions: percentage reduction in CO 2 emissions between 1992 and 1995,
calculated using figures from the World Development Indicators database. The original figures
refer to industrial emissions measured in metric tons per capita.
>  Reduction  in  CO2 Emissions Adjusted for  Changes  in  GDP: percentage  reduction  in  CO2
emissions plus percentage change in GDP during the corresponding  period.
Distance, GDP, GDP per capita and firm size are used in the log form.
20Table 1. Classification of 3-digit SIC sectors by pollution intensity
High Pollution
102 - Copper ores  276 #  Manifold business forms
109  - Miscellaneous  metal ores  278 - Blankbooks  and bookbinding
131 - Crude petroleum and natural gas  282 *  Plastics materials and synthetics
132 - Natural gas liquids  283 *  Drugs
172 - Painting and paper hanging special trade  284 *  Soaps, cleaners, and toilet goods
contractors
175 - Carpentry and floor work special trade  287 *  Agricultural chemicals
contractors
179 - Miscellaneous special trade contractors  308  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c.
205 #  Bakery products  314 - Footwear, except rubber
206 #  Sugar and confectionery products  325 - Structural clay products
224  - Narrow  fabric mills  326 *  Pottery  and related  products
226 *  Textile finishing, except wool  327 *  Concrete, gypsum, and plaster products
235 - Hats, caps, and millinery  328 - Cut stone and stone products
239 - Miscellaneous fabricated textile products  329 *  Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral
products
241 A  Logging  331 *  Blast furnace and basic steel products
242  Sawmills and planing mills  332 *  Iron and steel foundries
243  Millwork, plywood, and structural  333 #  Primary nonferrous metals
members
249  Miscellaneous wood products  341 #  Metal cans and shipping containers
251  Household furniture  344 *  Fabricated structural metal products
252 #  Office furniture  345 *  Screw machine products, bolts, etc.
254  Partitions and fixtures  347 *  Metal services, n.e.c.
259 - Miscellaneous furniture and fixtures  354 *  Metalworking machinery
261 #  Pulp mills  367 *  Electronic components and accessories
262 #  Paper mills  373  Ship and boat building and repairing
263 #  Paperboard mills  385 - Ophthalmic goods
272 - Periodicals  387 - Watches, clocks, watchcases, and parts
273 #  Books  393 - Musical instruments
275  Commercial printing
# emission but in another abatement category
* abatement but in another emission category
A only abatement data was available
- only emission data was available
21Low Pollution  Medium Pollution
142 - Crushed and broken stone, including riprap  201  Meat products
154 - General building contractors-nonresidential  204 *  Grain mill products
buildings
202  - Dairy  products  205  *  Bakery products
204 #  Grain mill products  214 #  Tobacco stemming and redrying
206 *  Sugar and confectionery  products  221 #  Broadwoven fabric mills, cotton
211  - Cigarettes  226 #  Textile finishing, except wool
214 *  Tobacco stemming and redrying  245 - Wood buildings and mobile homes
221 *  Broadwoven fabric mills, cotton  252 *  Office furniture
222  Broadwoven fabric mills, manmade fiber and silk  253  - Public building and related furniture
223  - Broadwoven  fabric  mills, wool  262  *  Paper mills
227  - Carpets and rugs  263 *  Paperboard mills
232 - Men's and boys' furnishings  265 #  Paperboard containers and boxes
261  *  Pulp  mills  271  "  Newspapers
265 *  Paperboard containers and boxes  282 #  Plastics materials and synthetics
273 *  Books  285  Paints and allied products
274  - Miscellaneous publishing  287 #  Agricultural chemicals
276 *  Manifold business forms  291  Petroleum refining
277 - Greeting cards  295 *  Asphalt paving and roofing materials
279 - Printing trade services  306  Fabricated rubber products, n.e.c.
283 #  Drugs  311  Leather tanning and finishing
284 #  Soaps, cleaners, and toilet goods  321 - Flat glass
295 #  Asphalt paving and roofing materials  322  Glass and glassware, pressed or blown
299  Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products  323  Products of purchased glass
301  Tires and inner tubes  324  Cement, hydraulic
302 - Rubber and plastics footwear  326 #  Pottery and related products
305  Hose and belting and gaskets and packing  327 #  Concrete, gypsum, and plaster products
317  - Handbags and personal leather goods  329 #  Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral products
331 #  Blast furnace and basic steel products  332 f  Iron and steel foundries
333 *  Primary nonferrous metals  336 *  Nonferrous foundries (castings)
334  Secondary nonferrous metals  339  Miscellaneous primary metal products
335  Nonferrous rolling and drawing  344 #  Fabricated structural metal products
336 #  Nonferrous foundries (castings)  346 *  Metal forgings and stampings
341 *  Metal cans and shipping containers  347 #  Metal services, n.e.c.
343  Plumbing and heating, except electric  348 *  Ordnance and accessories, n.e.c.
345 f  Screw machine products, bolts, etc.  353 #  Construction and related machinery
346 f  Metal forgings and stampings  354 f  Metalworking machinery
348 #  Ordnance and accessories, n.e.c.  356*  General industrial machinery
353 *  Construction and related machinery  358  Refrigeration and service machinery
356 f  General industrial machinery  359 - Industrial machinery, n.e.c.
361  Electric distribution equipment  362  Electrical industrial apparatus
364 #  Electric lighting and wiring equipment  364 *  Electric lighting and wiring equipment
366  Communications equipment  365 - Household audio and video equipment
367 #  Electronic components and accessories  372 #  Aircraft and parts
372 *  Aircraft and parts  374  Railroad equipment
376  Guided missiles, space vehicles, parts  382 - Measuring and controlling devices
381 - Search and navigation equipment  386  Photographic equipment and supplies
391  Jewelry, silverware, and plated ware  395 #  Pens, pencils, office, and art supplies
395 *  Pens, pencils, office, and art supplies
22Table 2. Measures  of environmental  standards  and corruption
Corruption  Reduction  in emissions
GCRIWDR  Neumann  Treaties  Standards  NGOs  Lead  Water  pollutants  CO2
Armenia  4.5  6  1.5  1  -136.4  8.4
Azerbaijan  5.5  6  1  1  -13.3  32.6
Belarus  5  4  1.5  1  97  34.5
Bulgaria  5.5  4  3.5  1  11.8  42  -27.3  -12.1
Croatia  4  2.5  2  39  39  -6.7  -7.7
Czech Rep.  3.3  4  2.5  3  49.5  -7.7  8.8
Estonia  2.6  2  2.5  2  21.9  72  23.0
Georgia  5  4  0.5  1  84.8
Hungary  3.9  6  3.5  3  69.1  -12.5  -3.8
Kazakhstan  5.1  4  2  1  15  28.0
Kyrgyzstan  4.9  4  0.5  1  -33.3  48.7
Latvia  4.6  4  2.5  2  22.2  -41.7  24.6
Lithuania  3.9  0  2.5  1  21.3  62  -25.0  31.4
Macedonia  8  1  1  36  5.6  1.0
Moldova  5  4  1  -80.0  46.9
Poland  4.6  4  2.5  3  15.5  27  -14.3  -0.6
Romania  6  2.5  2  9  -16.7  1.3
Russia  5.3  8  3.5  1  13.6
Slovak Rep.  3.6  4  2  2  26.1  45  -7.7  13.6
Slovenia  2  2  2  57  0.0  -16.8
Tajikistan  4  0  1  76.0
Turkmenistan  4  0  1  -6.5
Ukraine  4.3  4  2  1  75  -7.1  28.9
Uzbekistan  5.2  4  0  1  50  18.5
23Table 3a. Summary statistics
Variable  No. of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.
In (Firm size)  534  13.4  1.9
R&D-intensity  534  2.4  3.6
Regional experience  534  0.3  0.5
Emissions index  559  0.9  0.8
Abatement index  448  1.2  0.8
In (Distance)  11,726  8.2  0.9
In (GDP)  24  8.7  1.6
ln (GDP per capita)  24  6.6  1.1
Tax rate  22  29.5  6.4
Corruption GCR/WDR index  18  4.5  0.8
Corruption Neumann index  23  5.3  1.8
Participation in international treaties  24  1.9  1.2
Emissions standards  24  1.5  0.7
Reduction in CO2 emissions  24  19.9  25.9
Reduction in water pollution emissions  17  -26.5  35.6
Reduction in lead emissions  10  52.4  24.4
No. of environmental NGOs per mn population  12  31.5  18.9
24Table 3b. Correlations behveen country specific variables
In (GDP) In  (GDP  p.c.)  Tax rate Distance  GCvWDR  Neumann  Treaties 
In (GDP)  1.00
In  (GDP  p.c.)  0.71  1.00
Tax  rate  0.27  0.00  1.00
Distance  -0.08  -0.14  0.02  1.00
GCRIWDR  -0.04  -0.47  0.03  0.13  1.00
Neumann  0.21  -0.08  -0.19  o.04  0.45  1.00
Treaties  0.53  0.53  -0.01  -0.14  -0.20  0.03  1.00
Adj  Treaties  0.36  0.66  -0.34  -0.02  -0.22  0.09  0.42  1.00
Standards  0.53  0.72  0.12  -0.13  -0.60  -0.08  0.41  0.55  1.00
Adj Standards  0.45  0.76  -0.24  -0.03  -0,32  0.14  0.27  0.96  0.69  1.00
Lead  -0.68  -0.62  -0.36  -0.09  -0.29  -0.26  -0.19  0.(1  -0.33  -0.27  1.00
Water  pollut.  0.63  0.63  0.07  -0.07  -0.25  -0.11  -0.09  0.21  0.35  0.33  0.04  1.00
CO 2 -0.56  -0.73  -0.04  0.09  0.19  -0.15  -0.37  -0.28  -0.44  -0.29  0.54  -0.30  1.00
25Table 4.  Participation in international treaties
Treaties  Enforcement Adjusted Treaties
Firm size  0.0063***  0.0063***  0.0062***  0.0112***  0.0117***  0.0094***
(0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0015)  (0.0016)  (0.0017)
R&D-intensity  -0.0014***  -0.0014***  -0.0013***  -0.0038***  -0.0040***  -0.0029***
(0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0009)
Regional experience  0.0053**  0.0053**  0.0057**  0.0008  0.0009  0.0031
(0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0024)  (0.0031)
GDP  0.0088***  0.0089***  0.0088***  0.0191***  0.0212***  0.0154***
(0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0011)  (0.0034)  (0.0042)  (0.0031)
GDP per capita  0.0014  0.0016  -0.0003  0.0057  -0.0082  -0.0097*
(0.0031)  (0.0030)  (0.0019)  (0.0121)  (0.0097)  (0.0059)
Tax rate  -0.0003*  -0.0003**  -0.0001  -0.0020***  -0.0011  ***  0.0000
(0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0005)  (0.0002)  (0.0005)
Distance  -0.0097***  -0.0097***  -0.0098***  -0.0196***  -0.0206***  -0.0173***
(0.0019)  (0.0020)  (0.0024)  (0.0034)  (0.0035)  (0.0042)
Corruption  -0.0028  -0.0027  -0.0135*  **  -0.0128***
(0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0042)  (0.0041)
Env Regime  0.0007  0.0036  -0.0085**  0.0063*
(0.0021)  (0.0025)  (0.0039)  (0.0036)
Env Regime  -0.0026**  -0.0024**  -0.0025**  -0.0029**  -0.0040***  -0.0025***
* Emission Index  (0.0012)  (0.0009)  (0.0012)  (0.0013)  (0.0012)  (0.0011)
Number of obs  6,384  6,384  7,728  3,024  3,024  4,368
Wald Chi 2 1,330  1,305  921  605  1,359  1,563
Prob > Chi 2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pseudo R2 0.28  0.28  0.26  0.27  0.26  0.24
All results are presented in terms of marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean. Standard errors, listed in parenthesis,
have been corrected to take into account possible correlation between observations for the same country.
26Table  5.  Alternative  measures  of environmental  standards  in host countries
Standards  Adjusted  Reduction in emissions  Adjusted  reduction
Standards  Water  Lead  CO2 Lead  CO2
Firm  size  0.0065***  0.0114***  0.0063***  0.0079***  0.0062***  0.0080***  0.0067***
(0.0008)  (0.0018)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0008)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)
R&D-intensity  -0.0014*** -0.0039***  -0.0016***  -0.0018**  -0.0014***  -0.0018**  -0.0015***
(0.0005)  (0.0008)  (0.0005)  (0.0008)  (0.0005)  (0.0008)  (0.0005)
Regional  experience  0.0056**  0.0009  0.0023  0.0077**  0.0054**  0.0081**  0.0055**
(0.0024)  (0.0023)  (0.0020)  (0.0045)  (0.0023)  (0.0049)  (0.0025)
GDP  0.0088***  0.0210***  0.0085***  0.0116***  0.0085***  0.0118***  0.0090***
(0.0017)  (0.0036)  (0.0007)  '(0.0025)  (0.0014)  (0.0018)  (0.0017)
GDP per  capita  -0.0007  -0.0008  0.0024  0.0024  0.0029  0.0031  0.0020
(0.0034)  (0.0117)  (0.0021)  (0.0055)  (0.0031)  (0.0036)  (0.0038)
Tax rate  -0.0002*  -0.0013***  -0.0001  -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0007  -0.0002
(0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0005)  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)
Distance  -0.0097*** -0.0201***  -0.0087*** -0.0112***  -0.0095*** -0.0106***  -0.0104***
(0.0019)  (0.0042)  (0.0021)  (0.0026)  (0.0018)  (0.0024)  (0.0021)
Corruption  -0.0023  -0.0149**  -0.0021  -0.0082* **  -0.0023  -0.0071  * * *  -0.0030
(0.0027)  (0.0042)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  (0.0024)  (0.0020)  (0.0027)
Env Regime  0.0027  -0.0047  -0.0024  -0.0002  0.0022  0.0047  -0.0013
(0.0017)  (0.0039)  (0.0026)  (0.0047)  (0.0027)  (0.0032)  (0.0032)
Env Regime  -0.0012  -0.0037***  -0.0014  -0.0006  0.0013  -0.0017  0.0005
* Emission Index  (0.0008)  (0.0015)  (0.0029)  (0.0025)  (0.0018)  (0.0022)  (0.0019)
Number  of obs  6,384  3,024  4,368  3,024  6,384  3,024  6,048
Wald  Chi2 1,509  484  4,585  1,956  2,105  669  1,836
Prob  > ChiO  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pseudo  2 0.28  0.27  0.28  0.25  0.28  0.25  0.28
All results  are presented  in  terms of marginal  effects  evaluated  at the sample  mean.  Standard  errors,  listed  in parenthesis,
have  been  corrected  to take into  account  possible  correlation  between  observations  for the same  country.
27Table  6.  Alternative  measures  of pollution  intensity  - Abatement  costs
TreatIes  Adjusted  Standards  Adjusted  Reduction in emissions
Treaties  Standards  Water  Lead  CO2
Firmsize  0.0040***  0.01I1***  0.0041***  0.0113***  0.0043***  0.0044***  0.0038***
(0.0009)  (0.0022)  (0.0009)  (0.0024)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0009)
R&D-intensity  -0.0009*** -0.0040*** -0.0009*** -0.0041*** -0.0011"***  -0.0011*** -0.0009***
(0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0004)  (0.0008)  (0.0006)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)
Regional experience  -0.0007  -0.0066*  -0.0007  -0.0067*  -0.0005  -0.0024  -0.0007
(0.0014)  (0.0034)  (0.0014)  (0.0035)  (0.0023)  (0.0015)  (0.0013)
GDP  0.0059***  0.0234***  0.0061***  0.0253***  0.0083***  0.0059***  0.0057***
(0.0017)  (0.0051)  (0.0018)  (0.0054)  (0.0021)  (0.0018)  (0.0014)
GDP per capita  0.0024  -0.0011  0.0017  -0.0086  0.0067*  0.0044*  0.0046
(0.0028)  (0.0168)  (0.0031)  (0.0159)  (0.0043)  (0.0030)  (0.0031)
Tax rate  -0.0002  -0.0023***  -0.0002  -0.0016*** -0.0008***  -0.0001  -0.0002
(0.0002)  (0.0007)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)
Distance  -0.0094*** -0.0269*** -0.0096*** -0.0277*** -0.0090*** -0.0096*** -0.0091***
(0.0027)  (0.0056)  (0.0027)  (0.0065)  (0.0026)  (0.0034)  (0.0024)
Corruption  -0.0024  -0.0176**  -0.0022  -0.0188**  -0.0059**  -0.0013  -0.0016
(0.0024)  (0.0065)  (0.0026)  (0.0067)  (0.0023)  (0.0032)  (0.0024)
Env Regime  0.0012  -0.0104**  0.0006  -0.0070  0.0044**  -0.0037  0.0039
(0.0027)  (0.0053)  (0.0015)  (0.0048)  (0.0022)  (0.0039)  (0.0028)
Env Regime  -0.0010  -0.0007  0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0016  0.0010  -0.0004
* Abatement  Index  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0003)  (0.0006)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0010)
Number  of obs  4,427  2,097  4,427  2,097  2,097  3,029  4,427
Wald  Chi2 1,386  1,405  940  1,940  1,298  401  1,555
Prob  > Chi2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pseudo R2  0.32  0.28  0.32  0.27  0.31  0.31  0.32
All results  are presented  in terms  of marginal  effects  evaluated  at the sample  mean.  Standard  errors,  listed  in
parenthesis,  have  been  corrected  to take into account  possible  correlation  between  observations  for  the same  country.
28Table  7.  The Subsample  of U.S. firms
Adjusted  Adjusted  Reduction in emissions
Treaties  Treaties  Standards  Standards  Water  Lead  CO 2
Firm size  0.0041***  0.0020***  0.0041***  0.0021***  0.0034***  0.0029***  0.0038***
(0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0012)  (0.0015)  (0.0011)  (0.0015)  (0.0012)
R&D-intensity  -0.0009*  -0.0011  ***  -0.0010*  -0.0011  ***  -0.0004  -0.0010  -0.0009*
(0.0005)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  (0.0010)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)
Regional experience  0.0182***  0.0070***  0.0183***  0.0070***  0.0152***  0.0120***  0.0174***
(0.0066)  (0.0055)  (0.0064)  (0.0056)  (0.0067)  (0.0077)  (0.0060)
GDP  0.0050***  0.0027***  0.0051***  0.0027***  0.0011I**  0.0034***  0.0048***
(0.0022)  (0.0024)  (0.0021)  (0.0025)  (0.0007)  (0.0018)  (0.0020)
GDP per capita  -0.0030*  -0.0024  -0.0040**  -0.0016  -0.0075***  -0.0017*  -0.0028
(0.0020)  (0.0034)  (0.0022)  (0.0030)  (0.0020)  (0.0009)  (0.0021)
Tax rate  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0004***  0.0000  0.0000
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Distance  -0.0312*** -0.0318*** -0.0276*** -0.0303*** -0.0705***  -0.0040  -0.0260***
(0.0129)  (0.0269)  (0.0126)  (0.0258)  (0.0202)  (0.0102)  (0.0116)
Corruption  0.0002  -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0005  0.0014***  -0.0013*  -0.0002
(0.0013)  (0.0008)  (0.0012)  (0.0010)  (0.0006)  (0.0009)  (0.0011)
Env Regime  -0.0017  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0008  -0.0045***  -0.0016**  0.0034*
(0.0013)  (0.0007)  (0.0012)  (0.0008)  (0.0010)  (0.0009)  (0.0022)
Env Regime  0.0008  0.0006**  0.0010  0.0005  -0.0013  0.0010  -0.0029
* Emission Index  (0.0011)  (0.0005)  (0.0010)  (0.0004)  (0.0018)  (0.0007)  (0.0022)
Number ofobs  1,368  648  1,368  648  648  936  1,368
Wald Chi2 235  234  363  846  222  766  198
Prob  > Chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pseudo R2 0.35  0.42  0.36  0.42  0.39  0.39  0.36
All results  are presented  in terns of marginal  effects  evaluated  at the sample  mean.  Standard  errors,  listed  in parenthesis,
have  been  corrected  to take into  account  possible  correlation  between  observations  for the same  country.
29Table  8a.  Alternative  Measure  of Corruption  - Neumann  index
Adjusted  Adjusted  Reduction in emissions
Treaties  Treaties  Standards  Standards  Water  Lead  CO 2
Firm size  0.0070***  0.0107***  0.0073***  0.0107***  0.0078***  0.0071***  0.0068***
(0.0010)  (0.0017)  (0.0009)  (0.0016)  (0.0014)  (0.0013)  (0.0010)
R&D-intensity  -0.0015***  -0.0032*** -0.0015***  -0.0032***  -0.0016**  -0.0016*** -0.0014***
(0.0005)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)
Regional experience  0.0065**  0.0034  0.0071**  0.0035  0.0087**  0.0038  0.0063**
(0.0027)  (0.0036)  (0.0029)  (0.0036)  (0.0040)  (0.0027)  (0.0025)
GDP  0.0097***  0.0194***  0.0110***  0.0194***  0.0135***  0.0125***  0.0104***
(0.0023)  (0.0038)  (0.0020)  (0.0038)  (0.0023)  (0.0015)  (0.0014)
GDP per capita  -0.0013  -0.0183***  -0.0058*  -0.0240***  0.0045  0.0005  0.0044*
(0.0025)  (0.0074)  (0.0033)  (0.0075)  (0.0053)  (0.0022)  (0.0023)
Tax rate  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0004  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002
(0.0003)  (0.0006)  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)
Distance  -0.0109*** -0.0190***  -0.0111***  -0.0185*** -0.0109***  -0.0099***  -0.0107***
(0.0025)  (0.0042)  (0.0027)  (0.0038)  (0.0036)  (0.0026)  (0.0024)
Corruption  -0.0006  -0.0028  -0.0002  -0.0031  -0.0044*  -0.0005  -0.0002
(0.0010)  (0.0019)  (0.0011)  (0.0020)  (0.0024)  (0.0011)  (0.0010)
Env Standards  0.0059  0.0097**  0.0067***  0.0135***  0.0044  -0.0045*  0.0064**
(0.0046)  (0.0039)  (0.0020)  (0.0031)  (0.0036)  (0.0027)  (0.0026)
Env Regime  -0.0025*  -0.0029***  -0.0016*  -0.0035***  -0.0001  -0.0036  0.0021
* Emission Index  (0.0014)  (0.0012)  (0.0009)  (0.0013)  (0.0024)  (0.0029)  (0.0014)
Number  of obs  7,056  4,032  7,056  4,032  3,360  5,040  7,056
Wald  Chi2  2,091  983  1,404  1,146  1,246  561  1,038
Prob > Chi 2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pseudo  R2 0.25  0.23  0.25  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.25
All results are presented in terms of marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean. Standard errors, listed in parenthesis,
have been corrected to take into account possible correlation between observations for the same country.
30Table 8b. Neumann Corruption index with
Pollution Intensity Measured by Abatement Costs
Adjusted  Adjusted  Reduction in emissions
Treaties  Treaties  Standards  Standards  Water  Lead  CO2
Firm size  0.0039*** 0.0091*** 0.0050*** 0.0091*** 0.0036*** 0.0050*** 0.0041***
(0.0010)  (0.0023)  (0.0011)  (0.0021)  (0.0018)  (0.0014)  (0.0010)
R&D-intensity  -0.0008*** -0.0030*** -0.0011  *** -0.0030*** -0.0010*** -0.0011  *** -0.0009***
(0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0004)  (0.0008)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)
Regional experience  -0.0005  -0.0040  -0.0004  -0.0039  0.0001  -0.0023  -0.0005
(0.0016)  (0.0042)  (0.0021)  (0.0042)  (0.0021)  (0.0024)  (0.0017)
GDP  0.0060***  0.0204***  0.0091***  0.0204***  0.0100***  0.0113***  0.0079***
(0.0022)  (0.0051)  (0.0025)  (0.0051)  (0.0019)  (0.0022)  (0.0015)
GDP per  capita  0.0001  -0.0214***  -0.0042  -0.0283***  0.0099  0.0020  0.0060***
(0.0020)  (0.0089)  (0.0037)  (0.0090)  (0.0037)  (0.0028)  (0.0021)
Tax rate  0.0000  -0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0002
(0.0003)  (0.0008)  (0.0003)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)
Distance  -0.0100*** -0.0241*** -0.0124*** -0.0233*** -0.0077*** -0.0118*** -0.0104***
(0.0030)  (0.0061)  (0.0034)  (0.0055)  (0.0041)  (0.0039)  (0.0030)
Corruption  -0.0009  -0.0040  -0.0006  -0.0044*  -0.0037**  -0.0011  -0.0006
(0.0009)  (0.0024)  (0.0013)  (0.0024)  (0.0013)  (0.0012)  (0.0009)
Env Standards  0.0072  0.0085*  0.0048**  0.0121***  0.0111  -0.0105***  0.0089***
(0.0045)  (0.0047)  (0.0022)  (0.0033)  (0.0030)  (0.0044)  (0.0035)
Env Regime  -0.0012*  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0003  -0.0017  0.0003  0.0002
* Abatement Index  (0.0007)  (0.0010)  (0.0005)  (0.0010)  (0.0016)  (0.0010)  (0.0008)
Number of obs  4,893  2,796  4,893  2,796  2,330  3,495  4,893
Wald Chi2 866  2,068  632  847  415  735  398
Prob  > Chi2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pseudo R2 0.28  0.24  0.28  0.25  0.30  0.27  0.29
All  results  are presented  in  terms of marginal  effects  evaluated  at the sample  mean.  Standard  errors,  listed  in parenthesis,
have  been corrected  to take into account  possible  correlation  between  observations  for  the same  country.
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